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The companion cases, Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of
Education,' decided by the United States Supreme Court last term, pose
questions of interest to communitarian scholars as well as scholars of
constitutional law. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court
struck down efforts by the Seattle and Louisville area school districts to
maintain racial balance in their schools through school assignment plans
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that employed racial criteria. Reiterating the proposition that "'[r]acial
balance is not to be achieved for its own sake,' 2 Chief Justice Roberts'
plurality opinion rebuffed the justifications proffered by the two school
districts and concluded, "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.",3 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy accepted the proposition that diversity could be
a compelling interest that might survive the strict scrutiny accorded racial
classifications.4 But he nevertheless determined that the school districts
had failed to meet the burden of showing that their schemes were
narrowly tailored to meet this interest.5 Justice Breyer, dissenting (and
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg), argued that the school
districts had taken legitimate measures to integrate historically
segregated schools, and claimed that the Court's decision "undermine[d]
Brown's promise of integrated primary and secondary education that
local communities have sought to make a reality."
6
The issue of whether the benefits of integration justify the use of
racial classifications has been visited before.7  But communitarian
concerns are especially prominent in the Seattle and Louisville area
school cases, as both cases involve efforts by local school systems to
promote the community ideals of integration and diversity through
school assignment plans that brought race into account.8 Moreover,
while individuals whose school choice was affected by racial
classifications could claim to be "victims" of discrimination, all students,
including the alleged victims of racial classification, arguably stood to
benefit from the advantages of integration as contemplated under the
Seattle and Louisville schemes. While these schemes differed
substantially, they both used race as a criterion to achieve racial balance
in schools throughout an urban school district, thereby posing the
question of whether a community goal-integrated schools-trumped
the individual right not to be subject to a racial classification. 9
It was therefore only natural for the Association of American Law
Schools Section on Law and Communitarian Studies to present a
2. Id. at 2757, citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494.
3. Id. at 2768.
4. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 2789-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (racial criteria in law school
admissions); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (racial criteria in college
admissions); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (racial set-asides in
government construction contracts); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402
U.S. 1 (1971) (race-conscious school assignment plan).
8. See generally Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
9. See generally id.
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program on the Louisville and Seattle school cases at the AALS 2008
Annual Meeting in New York City. The appropriateness of such a
program became apparent to me even before the decision in Parents
Involved was announced; indeed, the program was slated months prior to
the June 28, 2007 Supreme Court decision. The AALS Sections on Civil
Rights and Minority Groups readily signed on as co-sponsors, for which
the relatively new Section on Law and Communitarian Studies is
grateful. This symposium issue of the Penn State Law Review includes
papers from most of the panelists at the AALS program. While another
program at the AALS meeting would examine the ramifications of
Parents Involved for law school affirmative action programs, the
Communitarian Studies program would focus on the communitarian
implications of these cases. The communitarian considerations, while
intersecting with legal doctrine, would not involve constitutional doctrine
exclusively, nor would they necessarily be limited to issues of race or
even to applications inside the United States of America. The direction
of the live discussion, the composition of the panel, and the articles in
this symposium issue reflect the broad range of these considerations.
Communitarianism: rights and interests. Communitarians have
suggested an agenda to advance commonly held social values without
unduly compromising individual rights. Even in a rights-conscious
society such as ours, individual rights have their limits, and carry with
them concomitant responsibilities.' 0 "Communitarians support basic
civil liberties, but fear that our ability to confront societal problems
effectively is compromised by the claims of "radical individualists" who
would subordinate the needs of the community to the absolute fulfillment
of individual rights."" Is the rights-based challenge to the Louisville and
Seattle school integration schemes an example of this phenomenon, i.e.,
are "radical individualists," by challenging these plans, subordinating the
community's legitimate needs to an inflated sense of individual rights?
Are the Seattle and Louisville integration plans but continuations of
laudable efforts to integrate (or avoid resegregation of) historically
segregated schools? Or do the challenges to these plans represent
legitimate assertions of fundamental rights-and even communitarian
values-in the tradition of Brown v. Board of Education? In defense of
the latter proposition, the Chief Justice stated:
The parties and their amici debate which side is more faithful
to the heritage of Brown, but the position of the plaintiffs in
Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have been
10. Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet
Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST. L. REV. 649, 650 (1995).
11. Id.
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clearer: "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from
according differential treatment to American children on the
basis of their color or race."
1 2
Despite my role as convenor and moderator of this discussion, I
must confess to a lack of neutrality on these issues. I view both the
Louisville and Seattle school integration plans as benign efforts to
achieve a legitimate social purpose, one that would ultimately benefit
even those claiming to have been victims of race-based discrimination.
That legitimate purpose, an integrated, pluralistic society, places these
cases in stark contrast to Brown v. Board of Education, which struck
down a practice that stigmatized African Americans, imposed severe
hardship on members of racial minorities and supported a degrading and
socially draining system of apartheid. 13  I must confess further to a
preference for the Louisville plan over the Seattle plan. The Louisville
school integration plan was substantially similar to a system of
integration previously imposed on the city and county by court order; 14 it
is difficult to see how what was mandated by law to promote integration
on one day could be an illegal form of discrimination the .next. It
allowed for fairly broad leeway in terms of racial composition of the
city's schools (from fifteen to fifty percent African-American) and used
race only as one of several criteria to determine school assignments.' 5
The Seattle plan, in contrast, was not only voluntarily implemented,16 but
tended to treat race in binary terms (i.e., "white" and "non-white"),
ignoring the rich multicultural composition of the school district.' 7 In so
doing, the plan gave short shrift to important distinguishing
characteristics that make Seattle such a vibrant community. In at least
one case cited by in Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion, a Seattle
child was denied access to a special education program because it was
offered at a school at which the racial tiebreaker precluded his
attendance. 18
12. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767, citing Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and
4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument in Brown L O.T.1953, p. 15 (Summary
of Argument).
13. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. See Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 72 F. Supp.2d 753, 762-764 (W.D.
Ky. 1999)
15. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749-50.
16. Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion suggests that a series of measures taken by
Seattle to integrate its schools was not truly voluntary at all, but was rather a response to
a series of legal challenges. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2802-06 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
17. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747-48.
18. The student was Andy Meeks, a ninth grader whose mother sought to enroll him
in Ballard High School's special Biotechnology Career Academy. Parents Involved, 127
S. Ct. at 2748. In my mind, to deny a student his/her choice of school in order to promote
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While others might view the circumstances in Seattle and Louisville
as involving rights in conflict, some communitarians are more apt to
view them as involving community efforts to adjust various interests,
which efforts should be left undisturbed by the courts. 19 They might say
that the Jefferson County, Kentucky and Seattle, Washington school
boards-products of a democratic electoral process-have, in seeking
the common good, adopted plans that serve the best interests of the
community-at-large, and that the courts should defer to local decisions of
this sort.2° Other communitarians, however, might see the use of racial
classifications as demeaning not only to the individuals involved but to
the community as a whole. Brown and its progeny also attacked
community-authored school attendance plans,21 and the fact that the
Louisville and Seattle school boards had seemingly benign intentions
may not obviate or excuse the fact that they employed a suspect
classification-race-to determine school assignments. The Court's
decision in Parents Involved may have been counter-majoritarian, but so
was its decision in Brown.
Our panel of commentators. The panelists at the AALS program
and the essays in this symposium represent a broad range of perspectives.
As a resident of Louisville, Professor Enid Trucios-Haynes (University
of Louisville) sets the scene. She suggests, in communitarian fashion,
that the Court has employed, in its race cases, a narrative structure of
Rhetorical Neutrality, an approach that "privileges individualism over
the substantive claims of historically oppressed groups. 22  Her live
presentation and her essay here depict a number of competing interests in
racial balance is one thing; to deny a student access to a distinct educational program due
to his race is quite another.
19. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
20. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer noted that "the law often leaves
legislatures, city councils, school boards, and voters with a broad range of choice, thereby
giving "different communities" the opportunity to "try different solutions to common
problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to
suit their individual needs." Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (C.A.1 2005) (Boudin, C.J.,
concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring))), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1061 (2005).
21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), invalidated locally-developed
school assignment plans in Kansas and South Carolina. See also, e.g., Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (addressing inter-district segregation in Detroit area);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (challenging locally
developed school attendance plan in North Carolina); Griffin v. County School Board,
377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding unconstitutional Virginia school board's decision to close
local public school and grant vouchers to students to attend private white-only schools).
22. Enid Trucios-Haynes and Cedric Merlin Powell, The Rhetoric of Colorblind
Contsitutionalism: Individualism, Race and Public Schools in Lousiville, Kentucky, 112
PENN ST. L. REV. 947 (2008) (infra).
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the Louisville school scene, asserting a variety of rights and entitlements
through a series of legal challenges, and a school board trying to wend its
way through a political and legal thicket to fashion a plan that could be
tolerated, if not embraced, by these interests. To some, the array of
interests and rights asserted in the Louisville litigation represents the
American judicial process at its best, in which a rights-based adjudicative
forum allows an assortment of voices to be heard. It is better to take to
the courts than to the streets, some would say; indeed, I have elsewhere
suggested that resort to the courts to resolve disputes can be seen as a
confirmation of the legitimacy of American legal institutions and an
affirmation of community. 23 But others, including Professor Trucios-
Haynes, question the cacophony of voices resorting to judicial process to
thwart decisions by elected majorities, turning what should be regarded
as political controversies into legal ones. Must every interest in America
boil down to a right? And must every issue in America be resolved
through a lawsuit? Or can we defer to democratic, community-based
decision-making?
I asked Professor Aderson Francois (Howard University) to join
the panel because he had written an eloquent amicus brief in Parents
Involved, a brief replete with communitarian themes.24  Professor
Francois' presentation was perhaps the most provocative of those heard
by our live audience. A sympathetic disposition toward the Louisville
and Seattle school integration efforts would be but a forlorn hope without
legal doctrine to support it, he suggested. And where might that doctrine
be found in a rights-oriented legal system? Through a right to
community, a right that might prevail over the more individually-focused
rights asserted by the petitioners in Parents Involved. I could not help
but comment on the irony that communitarian principles might find their
legal expression only through the minting of a new "right," a practice
generally discouraged by Amitai Etzioni and other communitarian
commentators. But Professor Francois' analysis brought a fresh insight
to the debate, and his work carried in this issue should ignite discourse
and debate for some time to come.
The live presentation and article by Professor Michael Wells
(University of Georgia) recognize the difference between the political
23. Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search
for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 27, 55 (2002).
24. Brief for Civil Rights Clinic at Howard University School of Law as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1 and Meredith v. Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-915).
25. See, e.g., ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND
COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF TORTS 250 (2004); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF
COMMUNITY 5 (1993) ("the incessant issuance of new rights, like the wholesale printing
of currency, causes a massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims").
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discourse of libertarians and communitarians and the legal discourse
with which the Court must grapple in Parents Involved. To Professor
Wells, it is the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation that
holds the balance, at least for the Court's majority. While the Court had
long recognized the legitimacy of race-based remedies for de jure
discrimination, de facto discrimination required the advocates of race-
conscious plans to surmount the burden of strict scrutiny. To
communitarians, for whom the de facto/de jure distinction-or the
public/private distinction, for that matter-is less compelling, it is easier
to justify the remedies for racial imbalance utilized by the school
districts. Professor Wells ultimately argues that "a range of policy
considerations should be brought to bear on the issue of whether the
segregation in a given school district should be characterized as de jure
or de facto." He thereby creates a means by which the Justices (and in
particular, the swing-voting Justice Kennedy) could adopt a less rigid
approach to cases such as these.
Two of the panelists were unable to contribute written papers for
this symposium. Nevertheless, in order to provide a well-rounded sense
of our live program, I have summarized their remarks here, with their
help. Professor Neil Siegel (Duke University) began his presentation by
taking note of the basic communitarian insights that personal identity is a
social identity and social identity is formed in significant measure by
education. It follows from those points, he suggested, that a key question
in Parents Involved was how the institution of public education in
American should go about performing its formation function-that is,
what the social mission of public education in America should be. Siegel
suggested that Justice Kennedy's own answer to that question provides
one criterion against which to assess the advisability of the constitutional
constraints he imposed. Siegel perceived in Kennedy's concurring
opinion a statesmanlike effort to fashion a form of law that could sustain
the allegiance of a divided nation. Nonetheless, he concluded that
Kennedy's stated understanding of public education as an engine of
interracial socialization and community counseled against barring almost
all use of racial classifications, when it is presently uncertain whether
communities can accomplish meaningful levels of racial integration
without them.
Our last two panelists were asked to look beyond the presenting
issue in Parents Involved-that of race-conscious efforts to integrate
American schools-to explore integration, segregation, and race-
consciousness in other contexts. Professor Rosemary Salomone (St
John's University), who was unable to submit a written article, addressed
two other traits-language and sex-that have been used for assigning
students to schools and programs, specifically in the contexts of bilingual
2008]
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education and single-sex schooling. Both have proven controversial and
have built on the Court's race jurisprudence. Both underscore the
dilemma of "difference" with all its inherent benefits and burdens. Yet
unlike the benign use of race, where the point is to integrate, minority
parents in particular continue to push for language and sex to be used in
ways that separate, albeit for benign purposes.
Using language as a proxy for race or national origin, Professor
Salomone explored whether there are sufficiently compelling reasons for
developing in students their home language as well as English,
justifications that consider the child's home language not as a negative
but as a personal and national resource. She suggested that here is where
community and diversity come into play, the first shaping identity and
the second, as in the case of race, promoting the common good both
nationally and globally. She discussed research findings demonstrating a
positive connection between native language use and the transmission of
cultural norms, values, and traditions within the family, on the one hand,
and student academic achievement, family cohesion, self esteem, and
educational aspirations on the other. She also discussed her own
interviews with second-generation immigrant law students who
underscore the importance of language as a critical factor in shaping their
identity and as a means of building an intergenerational alliance within
immigrant families. At the same time, she noted how allowing
immigrant children to maintain the linguistic tools they need to
participate meaningfully in their communities in turn produces well-
adjusted citizens who can also cross over linguistic borders and bridge
cultural gaps in the national interest.
26
Professor Salomone further explored single-sex schooling where,
unlike the situation involving language, separation in fact is at the heart
of the matter. She discussed how a substantial number of newly formed
single sex charter schools are designed and operated as an antidote to
failing schools. These schools represent a commitment on the part of
communities to forego the values and social benefits of gender
integration in order to achieve more long-term benefits for their children.
She noted that many of these programs for both girls and boys have long
wait lists for admission, high attendance and low dropout rates, high
achievement scores, and dramatic increases in college attendance among
their students. Professor Salomone noted that while at least a majority of
the Court currently recognizes that school officials can make decisions
26. These measures might help create both bonding and bridging social capital.
Political scientist Robert Putnam describes "bonding" social capital as inward-looking,
cementing homogenous groups. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22 (2000). He describes "bridging" social capital as
outward-looking and encompassing people across diverse social cleavages. Id.
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using race as one factor among others in order to achieve diversity or to
avoid racial isolation, other classifications such as language and sex
present differences and historical considerations that suggest other
permissible justifications that may in the interim result in isolation or
separation, but in the long term benefit both the individual and society.
Finally, Professor Paul van Seters (Tilburg University, Tilburg,
Netherlands) has provided, in his live presentation and essay, a
comparative perspective that focuses on the Netherlands experience-
one that may serve as a caution to Professor Salomone's suggestions.
The Dutch, he explains, have addressed the problem of equality of
educational opportunity through a constitutional guaranty of state
funding for schools of every religious denomination. That guaranty,
cautions Professor van Seters, has exacerbated the alienation of recent
immigrant groups-most notably those of the Muslim faith-from Dutch
life. As a consequence, a nation known for harmony and tolerance has
recently suffered through the sad experience of minority group
estrangement, recrimination, and even political assassination. The Dutch
experience should buttress the arguments of those who see integrated
public schools as a foundation of citizenship and civic engagement.
Professor van Seters concludes his essay by distinguishing between
three types of communitarianism: conservative communitarianism,
which "views human beings as greatly though not exclusively influenced
by their social, cultural, and political environment"; liberal
communitarianism, which "presupposes a close relationship between the
individual's autonomy, the goal of leading a rich and fulfilling life, and
the rights and duties attached to membership in a particular community";
and egalitarian communitarianism (alternatively called universalism or
liberalism), which "claims that humanity as a whole is the most
important, decisive community affiliation. 27 The programs described by
Professor Salomone may be seen as embracing the second of these
categories, while the Louisville and Seattle integration plans appear to be
premised on the third. The choice for American courts, and ultimately
American society, is whether our more universalistic instincts will win
out over individualism and even clannishness, so that we may construct a
diverse but integrated society with justice and opportunity for all.
27. Van Seters derives these distinctions from the German constitutional law scholar
Winfried Brugger. See Winfred Brugger, "Protection of Prohibition of Aggressive
Speech? Arguments from the Liberal and Communitarian Perspectives," in PAUL VAN
SETERS, COMMUNITARIANISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 163, 176-77 (Paul van Seters ed.,
Rowman and Littlefield, Publishers, Inc. 2006).
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